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The Roads and the Purposes
by Eow ARD H.

LEVI

This seems to be a period when a re-examination of undergraduate
education is not only desirable but also necessary. The burden on undergraduate education has greatly increased. It is engaged in mass education to an extent never before true, and because it is now mass education, perhaps its purposes must be more diverse than ever. Taken as
a whole, the educational enterprise is extremely costly. In its present
form it may be unsupportable, and its best attributes may be lost in
favor of its least justified qualities.
Because the purposes are diverse and the financing difficult yet
essential, and for other reasons as well, the directions of undergraduate
education are particularly susceptible to faddism which seeks not only
dollars but popular approval. New areas for inquiry, service and
relevant education are periodically and unceasingly discovered and
just as frequently criticized. The amount of criticism and apparent
dissatisfaction are high anyway. I do not mean to overemphasize
this. A great deal of the criticism is of a kind which education has
always received over many centuries and really thousands of years,
despite the variety and forms which education has taken. Some of
the criticism seems strangely misplaced, appearing to echo itself more
than to describe reality. But many lives are involved. Some of the
assumptions widely held concerning collegiate education are most
disturbing. For example, it is sometimes suggested that the educational
establishment is used to keep young people out of the job market in
order to protect the economy, and then on the contrary it is said that
the system is used primarily to prepare people for the requirements
of an industrial machine. I suppose both could be true, although the
first seems foolish, and there would seem to be better ways to accom-
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plish the second. These assumptions and similar cnt1c1sms, however,
are a reminder tha t one cannot really look at undergradua te education
by itself. One must see it within the spectrum of formal education
as a whole, and a lso as but a part of a larger society which could
and does have many different ways of providing training and cultural
pursuits. The public library is, after all, the descendant of great
museums. These institutions, vocational schools, on-the-job training
and a variety of other possible arrangements, including new forms of
communication, a:re much in the picture. It should give us a pause,
perhaps pleasure or alarm, to realize that the presen t system need
not be immutable. Almost a ny idea we can think of has been tried
out in the past. It is the dimensions, and related to that, the compulsions of formal education which a re new, but these can make a
good deal of difference. We have to think about tha t education
which everyone or most should have. We have to think about specialized training and the preservation or creation of quality. These are
not new questions, but th ey are in a new context because of the
numbers of people involved , the costs, and the length of time our
present system preempts.
Since the field we must plow is filled with distractions, difficulties
and strong allegiancies, let me state my conclusions. The points I have
in mind are the following :
Despite the doubts which are among the chief attributes of our
present civilization, a nd perhaps because of them, I believe our educational system requires a reaffirmation of the reality and validity of
the truth-finding process, intellectually based, with the acceptance
of requirements of civility, criticism and integri ty.
Overall, we require a greater amount of openness within, to and
from our educational structure . The problem is to encourage a nd
preserve the autonomy and diversity of institutions and to permit
and sponsor greater freedom for the individual student. This means
that there should be more choices, but, of course, it does not mean
that the choices won't have consequences.
In order to create more openness and to give more choices, I
suggest we should begin experimen ting with a system of national
examinations, dealing with separate subjects, not a ttempting a certifica tion in general areas, not determined by the requirements of any
particular institution, but perhaps sponsored by cooperating institutions and administered by independent agencies. In this way I believe
these will give examinations emphasis to and encourage diverse
educational roads.
I believe we must be much more serious about the levels of education, not only because cost factors and, therefore, need and the
allocation of resources are involved, but because the mixture of
compulsion, voluntariness, competence and the necessary interrela-
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tionship among scholars and disciplines differs from one level to another. More points of entrance and exit with accomplishment and
recognition from the formal educational system would be desirable
for students.
I think it is likely that new kinds of institutions and new forms
of instruction will have to be developed if the goals of mass education and continuing education are to be more nearly realized. Some
of these new forms will turn out to be highly desirable in particular
ways. Some may be harmful to the quality of education we now
have. Thi5 is one reason why increased openness within the system
and some non-institutional standards ,,viii be desirable.
I believe it is essential that institutions of education be much
more concerned than they have been with the length of time preempted by formal education. Shorter alternative roads should be made
avai lable and tried out. I believe this applies in a major way to undergraduate education, but also to graduate and professional training.
All kinds of requirements and regulations now stand in the way. But
I would urge that such alternatives could contribute to the quality
of both instruction and research.
I have referred to the doubts which are among the chief attributes
of our civilization. It is with these doubts, I believe, we must come
to terms. The concepts which we use, as, for example, for liberal as
well as general education, are somewhat outmoded if we take them
in some original meaning. They imply divisions of society which we
reject. And general education, in addition to saying something ambiguous about the organization of knowledge, now must mean that
education which should be generally available.
The flexibility and uncertainty of these concepts help push us
to a consideration of the characteristics of the kind of higher education we prefer. They are also a reminder, however, that one of the
peculiarities of our system of education has been its emphasis not on
morality, but upon the intellectual disciplines. Perhaps it is more
accurate to say our system embodies the belief that morality can be
more effectively taught through, and is implicit in, the intellectua l
disciplines viewed as a process-a morality thus arising out of the
recognition of excellence and the honesty enforced by self-criticism.
Other systems with different emphases are certainly imaginable for
us. Some of their attributes have crept into some of the peripheral
objectives of some of our colleges and universities, and are, at times,
more central than that. Thus, physical prowess, Spartan virtues and
abilities, service to the community- perhaps we should include proficiency in performance of some of the arts-have been seen in some
places as fairly central appropriate objectives for their kind of liberal
or general education. But the main thrust and the claim to independence for our institutions of higher learning and their scholars have

7

been based upon the possibility of a n honest a nd disciplined intellectual search for understanding. This does not mean tha t institutions
of higher lea rning have not been labeled through time, sometimes
correctly, as centers for unrest and revolutionary thought, or as instruments for the establishment. It does not mean they a re not part
of the civiliza tion which created them. It does mean they have found
their integrity in a sufficien tly sha red belief in the reality of intellectual truth. Much of mankind often has not believed in this kind
of base for higher education. A varying part of the religious impulse
is certainly contrary. There need be no claim tha t the perception a nd
sea rch for intellectual truth is the only kind of understanding or
experience worth having, or, indeed , the highest kind . The maintenance of this kind of base for higher education has never been easy.
Few societies, including our own, have not witnessed the exalta tion
of the breaking of inkpo ts, the ba nning of scholars a nd books.
But we have a specia l problem. We have a society in which , as
Sir Isaiah Berlin has d escribed , the normal or periodic peaking of
enthusiasm for the irrational- which can be an understood and
appreciated phenomenon- is now combined with the fruits and thrust
of intellectual movements themselves as shaped a nd reformul a ted
through popula rization. This kind of joining is not unique, but it
now constitutes a new and powerful influence. The intellectual descriptions of the forces of the irrational and the unconscious, assumptions about the automa ticity of scientific laws which control our perceptions; an ardent belief in the almost unlimited power of institutions
and technology to compel values a nd behavior- all these are u sed
to downgrade the conception of objective truth a nd the validity of
the rational process. The conclusions of this a rgument probably run
some distance from the way they a re taken. Perhaps even the most
extreme paradoxes in it can be resolved . It will be pointed out also
tha t free inquiry, if it is to be free, benefits from other fai ths and
skepticism. If terms other than intellectual and rational must be used
to make the claim for the validity of inquiry, no doubt this can be
done. The question, however, is the effect of these movements on the
independence, integrity a nd worthwhileness of our present insti tutions
of higher learning. I doubt if we a re prepa red to say that if the
intellect has, indeed, eaten itself, so much the better for poetic justice.
The movements can destroy excellence from within a nd make the
institutions pa rticula rly vulnerable to pressures from without. The
very fact that much of education is compulsory, formative and supported by the state makes the claim for a base for independent values
pa rticula rl y important. But if education and inqui ry a re to be regarded
either as technical exercises which might just as well be externally
directed , or as the imprinting of a set of given values where the attempt
to understand is sham, for the mind is not sufficiently free, then edu8

cation is in a power struggle which there is no particular reason it
should win, and many reasons it should lose. Hence, unless we find
some other basis for excellence and independence, or discard these
values, I believe a reaffirmation is required-a reaffirmation which
accepts, protects and regards as important the ways of intellectual
inquiry. This reaffirmation is not suggested as a test oath or a statement to be signed, or a formal or informal declaration of any kind.
It will exist, if at all, as a personal matter resulting in a sufficiently
shared spirit and shared ways of conduct which will keep our institutions viable and important during this most difficult period of readjustment. If this does not occur, perha ps it means the institutions are
not worth saving anyway.
I believe both the continuation and integrity of our institutions
of higher learning are important. I doubt whether they should have
the kind of sovereignty which seems to have been unwittingly given to
them, and perhaps equally unwittingly accepted by them. The notion
that a four-year college is the necessary gateway to life or a screening
device for industry or for graduate training is, itself, anti-educational.
It depreca tes self-education. Not only does it state a formula for
learning in terms of the passage of time, but it has worked in practice to increase the required length of time. The prestige does not
go to the institution which can do the best job in the briefest period.
So the long road has grown longer, and with adverse consequences.
To some extent the system feeds upon itself. Graduate training becomes a requirement for teaching. Professional education is buttressed
in its insistence upon more years by the rules of its own associations,
licensing requirements, and university regulations. Faced with the
boredom of students, professional schools a re not urged to incorporate
within their curricula the kind of practice and training which had
previously escaped the hold of formal education. An alternative,
a nd perhaps better road, would be to shorten the time.
Strangely enough, this apparent mandate to the institutions to
control and develop education as they think best has not worked
to create great diversity or to provide as many options as one might
have imagined. The p articular institution presumably is free within
the broadest range to develop a new structure to exemplify a liberal
a rts or general education for our day. The dreary repetition of distribution requirements, or courses announced as general, or courses
which mirror the specific explorations of members of the faculty, but
are said to be particularly good because a professor does best what
he knows the best, generally mark the academic scene from one place
to another. One could say the curriculum is not that important, but
it is hard to say tha t, in view of the length of time which now stretches
ahead for many students.
If the lack of diversity in institutional approaches is depressing,
9

more depressing are many of the forced so-called experimental programs which explore and build upon friendship and community, and
which are often shepherded by the weakest disciplines and the weakest
faculty. A recent, I gather highly regarded, article in the Saturday
Review, which knows about these things, makes this personal pronouncement, speaking of our colleges and high schools: "I used to
imagine that one fine afternoon the doors of all the offices would
open wide with a trumpet blast and teachers and students would
emerge to dance hand in hand in total golden nakedness on the campus
lawns in a paroxysm of truth." The point, of course, as the article
says, is an emphasis, which the writer is for, on "a kind of psychic
survival: our ability to live decently beyond institutional limits and
to provide for our comrades enough help to sustain them." Perhaps
so. And perhaps this romanticism would make the forced sojourn
of a degree program more palatable. The colleges and universities
may have become the escape and substitute for life, but we should
have some way of saying this isn't the only way to get an education.
After this quotation let me say that the lack of experimenting with
new techniques for instruction seems particularly surprising. Again
prestige factors seem to be at work. Small classes are better than big
ones. Discussions are better than lectures. Books are better than films.
How do we know? If it cost less for students to be in a big class,
which would they choose, and do we know where they would learn
the most? What if it were to be found they enjoy it less but are
learning more? I realize this flies in the face of many of the things
we love, but isn't that part of the problem?
What I am trying to suggest is that we have not achieved diversity
by an institutional approach, and the attempt to introduce diversity
through the forced feeding of subsidies for the kinds of programs
government and foundations are likely to favor has probably often
reduced quality. Why should a subsidy be required anyway for an
attractive experimental program which an institution wishes to introduce? If there were pressures on an institution to do a better job,
then it might require a subsidy to keep it from dropping a program
it regarded as poor. The institutional framework does not seem to
have been particularly conducive to exploring the substance of what
should be taught for various levels of education, and the way the
subject matter should be taught. I overstate, of course, but it takes
a distracting act of will to begin one of these revisions. I believe our
problem is to find some way to free the institutions from the apparent
necessity to do the standard thing with the usual experimental
varieties, to give to the institutions some feeling of achievement when
they are able to do the job faster than before, and to give them some
greater assurance that students stay on because they want to and have
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some senous scholarly purpose to achieve, and not because they are
trapped.
The remedies I suggest are worth a try; that is, the attempt to
introduce greater flexibility by reintroducing a degree for general
education, perhaps ( to speak in terms of time which I would like
to avoid) after something like two years of college work; the rearrangement of professional and graduate work so that they can
begin after this two-year period; the further reduction in time of
much graduate and professional work, and the introduction-perhaps
a timid introduction-through joint arrangements among some
colleges or universities--of national examinations administered by an
independent agency, with the hope that these examinations might
be sufficiently useful so that students and non-students would find
it desirable to take them. If the examination system works, then I
am sure many more kinds of institutions will find they are ready to
help the students prepare. I realize there are all kinds of problems
with external examination systems. They in themselves can become
a pernicious form of control furthering the cartelization of education
or becoming instruments of dominations. For this reason it is important
that the examinations not attempt to be a new packaging of education
but rather be on separate and in that sense narrow subjects, as one
way of testing competence in those a reas. This will make for a much
greater truthfulness as to what the examinations are about. I do not
think they should be competitive with degrees except in the sense
that they represent a different approach. So far as shortening the time
is concerned, I do not suggest the briefer programs as the only road.
They should represent alternative ways.
We are all concerned about the ability of education to respond to
diverse tasks which have been placed upon it. These tasks require
many more kinds of institutions, much more flexibility in the kinds
of programs and means of instruction. Some means has to be found ,
and I do not believe the road of subsidy, by itself, will accomplish
it, to encourage the appearance and participation of these institutions,
and the trying out of programs and methods of instruction.
A more open system has risks, but it could reassemble to greater
advantage the strength which is there. Obviously, such an open system,
with national or independent examinations, with shorter alternative
roads, and with the ability to accommodate more to the student's
own pace, will not, itself, substitute for the help which education
requires at many levels. It would be, however, a serious a ttempt to
provide alternative and useful roads to accomplish the purpose of a
general education for all.
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What Is Relevant 1n General and
Liberal Education
by

BENJAMIN

E.

MAYS

Few men are wise enough to know the exact kind of curriculum
or contents of a general or liberal education which we might adopt
now that will be wholly adequate for every student, to say nothing of
five or ten years from today. Many curricula, methods and programs
of education which were accepted by many as law and gospel or
scientific realities years ago have either been discarded or are under
heavy criticism in 1970 by those who are supposed to know. This holds
true, of course, of educators who were considered experts in yesteryears.
I come, therefore, not as an expert in any particular field of
education, because thirty-three of my professional years were spent
as an administrator-dean and college president. Although changes
in education are taking place all the time, I do not subscribe to the
theory that everything we did in yesteryears was bad or nonproductive in preparing our students for life, not everything we are
doing now is out of joint and not every change we make for the future
will be valuable under close scrutiny tomorrow. But we have no
choice but to try to make our educational programs more and more
adequate for our students in our time.
We hear a great deal today about relevant education. We often
hear our students say that this course or this curriculum is not relevant to our needs. They are all too often right. Our courses of study
should meet the current needs of our students and prepare them as
m uch as possible to do the work of the world that needs to be done.
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But it is not always easy to determine when a course or curriculum
is relevant. We need to ask the question, relevant to what? It is easy
to see how courses in engineering or courses in medicine, law, accounting or teaching may bear directly upon making a student a
better engineer, surgeon, lawyer, accountant or a better teacher. But
courses not so directly related to these skills and professions, not so
directly related to making a living, may be very relevant to life itself.
For clarity I draw a distinction between knowledge that is relevant
to making a living and knowledge that is relevant to life itself, knowing
full well that knowledge that is relevant to making a living has to be
relevant also to life itself. It is probably true that a thorough knowledge of Shakespeare or Homer, or knowledge of philosophy, social
science, and the humanities may not necessarily make an engineer
build a better bridge or make the surgeon more skilled in his surgery,
an accountant more competent on his job or a pilot more precise in
piloting and landing the plane; but knowledge of these disciplines
will broaden one's educational horizon, enrich his life and in many
instances may make him a better man, a more humane person, and
one more concerned with the welfare of others. In one sense every
subject can be relevant to life.
Let me emphasize this point from another point of view. You
know, I know, every literate, honest man knows that the contributions the black man has made to the life and development of this
nation have largely been excluded from our history and largely ignored
by white authors and Negro authors as well. Much of the research
on the black man that has been done was done with a bias, designed
to paint the Negro in an unfavorable light. Within recent years there
is, however, a great emphasis in our colleges and universities on Black
Studies, Black History, Black Art, etc. Are these studies relevant?
It all depends upon how you look at it. I do not believe that
Black Studies of themselves will make a man a better corporation
lawyer, a better mathematician, a better chemist, or a better physicist.
But if Black Studies give the Negro or black student a better understanding of his forebears, a deeper appreciation of what black people
have contributed to the United States and to the world, and thus
enable him to be proud of what he is, apologizing to nobody, not even
to God for what he is, and enable him further to walk the earth with
dignity and sane pride, then Black Studies are relevant to his life.
If, on the other hand, Black Studies open the eyes and minds
of white students so that they too will know that the cards have been
stacked against the black man and the dice loaded against him and
they now see the contributions of the black people in their true light,
helping them to overcome some of their prejudices and reduce
racism, then Black Studies are relevant even if they make no contribution to the pocketbook. If both the black students and the white
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students are made better human beings by the invasion of the traditional curriculum with good stiff courses in Black Studies, they are
relevant to life. And such courses should not be set up for black
students only but should be a part of the regular curriculum as all
other disciplines are and made available to all students in the college.
Though paying special attention to the needs of black students in our
colleges, education is not a game for separatists and segregationists.
Knowledge is indivisible. Such courses should not be made a part of
the curriculum merely under the pressure of black students but mainly
because American education is incomplete and inadequate without a
true appraisal of the contributions minority groups have made to
American life in science, art, literature, education, sports and religion.
Honesty in the educational endeavor should require it and not pressure from blacks. Unfortunately most colleges and universities have
had to be pressured into providing courses in Black Studies. I hope
that by the time the pressure is lifted, Black Studies will be so interlaced, interwoven and interturned with the curriculum of the college
or university that never again will this discipline be lost sight of.
Whether a curriculum is relevant and adaptable to meet the needs
of a rapidly changing society depends almost wholly upon those of
us who teach. When students complain about irrelevant courses, they
are often complaining about irrelevant teachers, teachers who are
unable to adopt new methods and new ways of doing things and unable
to adapt themselves to change.
In an age of emphasis on relevancy when our students are prone
to set aside disciplines which to them are irrelevant, I make bold
to assert that knowledge is good for its own sake even when it is
never used directly in the a rt of making a living. Our faculties should
see to it that this emphasis is not lost sight of, however drastic the
change may be in an effort to gear the curriculum to what the students demand and what the occupational world requires. To be able
to enjoy the best in music, art, literature, and science is not a mere
luxury to be enjoyed but an experience to enrich life and to make man
better. There is no dichotomy here. In the hands of a gifted, creative
and imaginative teacher every course can be made relevant and more
and more relevant to fit the urgency of the changing times.
Despite this rather optimistic note of relevance in subject matter,
it is predicted by some experts that the present decade 1970 to 1980
will witness changes in the economy that will require drastic changes
in the curriculum of general and liberal education. Andrew F. Brimmer, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
speaking at Atlanta University recently pointed out some of the things
that will occur in the 1970's that will have significant consequences
for our college curriculum and produce a shift in the kind of skills
required. For a long time, there has been a shortage of classroom
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personnel, especially in elementary and secondary education. If the
recent entry pattern in this profession continues there will be a surplus
of elementary and secondary school teachers, perhaps more pronounced
among Negroes. Even in the scientific fields, Brimmer predicts that
there may also be a surplus of mathematicians and life scientists,
especially biologists, if students continue to concentrate in these fields
in the same ratio as in past years.
Predicted further is the likelihood that shortages will occur in the
1970's in chemistry, geology, geophysics, engineering, health occupations, and shortages in medicine, including physicians and dentists.
Potential shortages may occur in such areas as counseling, social work,
urban planning, and a number of occupations involved in the planning
and administration of state and local governments. These changes will
fall heavily upon all colleges and universities but especially upon the
small colleges and particularly upon Negro colleges where resources
are meager. New opportunity in several fields will require large
investments in qualified faculty and instructional equipment. In the
areas where surpluses occur, the colleges and industry may be called
upon to train the surplus people to acquire skills in other areas. That
changes can occur quickly, may be seen in physics. A few years ago
physicists were in short supply whereas today my colleagues in education tell me that they are relatively easy to come by in 1970.
I suppose there is a constant factor in education which teachers
should strive to perpetuate and that is to try to stimulate sound thinking in our students and develop their minds so that they will be able
to qualify quickly for new work when shifts and changes in the economy
so dictate. This may be one of the reasons why we should hold fast
to general and liberal education in addition to specialization in a
particular area, one of the reasons we should be slow to eliminate
courses which are considered by some to be irrelevant.
There was a time when colleges and universities were too ivory
tower, too far removed from the people in the community, even from
the poor and minority groups a few hundred yards from their campuses.
I believe that day is gone and will hardly return. Without anyway
dulling the edge of scholarly production and emphasis on research,
it is my considered judgment that college and university courses should
be related to community problems not for the sheer sake of knowing
but for the sake of contributing solutions to community problems
and also to bridge the social gap between institutions of higher learning and the most needy people in the community.
I do not know enough about the many disciplines to suggest how
this relationship can be established. But it seems to me that no student
should be allowed to earn an A.B. or B.S. degree without somewhere
along the way having been given an opportunity to engage in some
meaningful community activity that will broaden his wcial vision and
15

will be helpful to the people in a particular community. And I mean
something that is more significant and more relevant than merely teaching a Sunday School class in a church or helping a high school boy with
his French or mathematics. This relationship should not be left to
chance nor be haphazardly done but it should be a part of the curriculum planning of the junior college, technical school, college or
university. Such an attachment should commit a part of the resources
of the institution to a program designed to help the community in
every way it can.
I am sure that such a commitment can be more easily carried
out in the social sciences, but I am equally convinced that the science
departments and other disciplines can participate in community programs as well.
No one can deny the tremendous contribution that professors who
devote most of their time to research are making to the total sum of
constructive knowledge but more attention should be given to those
able teachers who may do less research but who devote much time to
counseling and helping their students. An able, outstanding teacher
should receive as much by way of salary as the research man who does
little or no teaching or if he does teach, his classes are turned over
to graduate assistants.
I believe that the students themselves will, in the years ahead,
require that able research professors devote considerably more time
to teaching and to the students than is normally required at the
present time, especially in the colleges attached to large universities
where graduate assistants relieve the major professors of teaching and
of contact with the undergraduate students.
Let me comment on one of the points President Levi touched on
last night in his address, 'The Roads and Purposes," that is, the need
of more diversity and experimentation in our undergraduate teaching.
After concluding twenty-seven years as President of a small college,
I was forced to say in my final address at the college that this lack
of diversity and experimentation on the part of the college faculty
was one of my chief disappointments. I had to conclude that it often
happens that conservatism in educational matters is not always the
fault of the administration. I really believe that my faculty on the
whole was far more conservative and less ready to accept changes
in the curriculum and less willing to experiment in order to find new
ways of doing things than the administration was. They were able
men and women. They held A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from some of
the most prestigious and renowned universities in this country. And
yet, I found a reluctance to change that was baffling.
I am certain that some of the complaints that students often make
of irrelevant methods and courses can be explained by the fact that
too many professors are not willing to try new courses and new ways
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of teaching. I know that experimentation for the mere sake of experimenting will serve no useful purpose without an instrument designed
to evalua te the results of the experiment.
I cannot assume that my experiences can be universally validated
but it seems clear to me that the colleges tha t will stand the best
chance of keeping curricula relevant and the best chance of finding
dollars to support their institutions will be those institutions that are
not allergic to experimentation and change. And all of this goes back
to what we said earlier in this talk- when we talk about what is
relevant in general and liberal education we are really talking about
"How releva nt are the men and women who teach in our colleges
and universities."

00====

17

000

••

Do

Philosophy and the Liberal Arts
by

MICHAEL

J.

BUCKLEY,

S.J.

The focus of these remarks is a simple, general question: How
should philosophy be taught to college students? Notice that the
possibility is simply taken for granted. We do not ask if we can teach
but how we can teach. Is this to treat philosophy like any other field
within the humanities or sciences? We give instruction in mathematics,
physics, history, English literature; can we not also teach philosophy?
An etymological rephrasing would suggest this assumption is open to
serious reservations. How can college students be taught "to love
wisdom?" Can so radical a personality-commitment be taught, be
the product of three unit courses? Is there any other subject-matter
within the contemporary liberal curriculum which speaks of love as
its finality with wisdom as its object? At least three serious difficulties
confront this presupposition of our initial question. They should be
raised and may serve, perhaps, as coordinates within which we may
chart a response, if not an answer, to the inquiry we have set ourselves.
The question belongs to an educational institution, not only because it touches some form of instruction-however ambiguous this
activity-but because "wisdom" is historically associated with the
whole purpose of education: with the Academy, the Lyceum, the
Stoa, the Garden, the University, and the College. Yet any professor
who attempts this profession must recognize paradoxically that he is
a man uniquely censored within its history. From the Platonic condemnation of the sophists who exacted tuition and claimed to teach
wisdom through the medieval meaning of philosophus and Schopenhauer's acid question: "How can philosophy degraded to become a
means of earning one's bread generally fail to degenerate into sop-
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histry?"l And now even to the most influential thinkers of our period
Heidegger has claimed: "The misinterpretations with which philosophy is perpetually beset are promoted most of all by people of our
kind, that is, by professors of philosophy."2 Wittgenstein attempted
to dissuade his pupil Norman Malcolm, currently at Cornell University, from a career as a philosophy professor, because he judged that
a normal human being could not be a university instructor and an
honest and serious thinker. The teacher had to pretend to an omnipotence he did not possess, one which could not afford to stay with
questions for years because of the demands of the weekly lectures and
the quarter-syllabus. The teacher was expected both by students and
administration to rhetorize serious, painstaking philosophic inquiry to
dazzle students and gain the reputation and tenure of an "interesting
teacher." To Malcolm, Wittgenstein wrote: "The temptation for you
to cheat yourself will be overwhelming (though I don't mean for you
more than anyone else in your position). Only b'Y a miracle will you
be able to do decent work in teaching philosophy. Please remember
these words if you forget everything I've ever said to you."3 The
antinomy here is between the possession of wisdom and its profession,
and the history of philosophy indicates the depth of the estrangement.
The difficulty of our assumption lies not only in an antithetical
relationship between teaching and wisdom but also within the sources
and nature of wisdom. "Wisdom" runs like a theme through Western
thought and educational institutions, but in various locations its
meanings differ profoundly. It can denote "knowing all things, though
not in detail" or the reflexiYe realization that one knows nothing
while others think they do. "Wisdom" has embraced either conclusions reached or the methods by which they are reached or the
principles from which these methods proceed and by which these
conclusions are justified. "Wisdom" can be either a habit of thought
or a manner of choice or a conditioned sensitivity to values or a life
which issues from reflection, decision, and perception. It can be a
particular human achievement or a comprehensive divine gift which
subsumed them all. Whatever its definition and location, however,
"wisdom" always touches upon something ultimate, something absolute
enough to have other things related to it or evaluated by it. Whatever its pluralisms, I suggest that in Anglo-Saxon countries serious
students have turned from philosophy courses elsewhere in the aca-

1 Arthur Schopenhauer, "Preface to the Second Edition," 'The World as
Will and Representation. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. (New York: Dover, 1958)
Vol. i, p. xx.
2 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Ralph Manheim. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961) p. 9.
3 Norman Malcom, Ludwig Wittgenstein , A Memoir. (London: Oxford,
1958) pp. 36-37.
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demic search for ultimates or absolutes. As in Socrates' time, wisdom
is derivative for most students: The conclusions of poets, dramatists,
scientists, and artists-even of enthusiasts and seers-are taken for
wisdom, though they be unable to ground or explain their own propositions. Logistic methods of mathematics in their exactitude or operational methods of science in their productivity are taken for wisdom,
and used paradigmatically to judge the seriousness of other methods
and other forms of discourse. Transcendent principles of religion or
of revolution or human principles of sensitive interrelations are taken
for wisdom, as if what is most profound may be beyond reason but
not beyond emotion, action, or experience. But wisdom as a unique,
a philosophic enterprise--one with its own principles, methodologies
and resolutions-is neither very much the subject of courses in "philosophy" nor the object of policy or programmed instruction, indicating
anything like "love." This curricular stance of the American university also forms part of our problem: How can the college student be
taught to love wisdom?
The ambiguous position of the professor and the derivative nature
of wisdom compound the difficulties with the third term of our
question: the college students. Here, I am speaking of the undergraduate student, especially of liberal arts students, but by no means
exclusively so. Philosophers have habitually considered youth too callow
or too enthusiastic to care about much besides pleasures, wars, ambitions and loves. Contemporary educationalists have judged him
either too inexperienced or too financially oriented to entertain an
education which was neither specialized in its departments nor geared
to a career. And so the undergraduate college has lost its unique
fin ality. Professional schools and graduate departments have reached
down into the college to train students even earlier for the specialists
they are to become or for the careers they are to enter. So much of
the liberal arts have become pedantic or technical training in a
speciality, while the genuinely liberal tradition-whose aim was, under
one or another variant, to free a student-is little understood in its
theory or operative in significant practice. Most undergraduate colleges
are content to train the student technically, because this is what he
wants or what he needs or where he is or where he is going.
The assumption of the possibility of philosophic instruction,
then, conceals a threefold diremption: between the professorial career
and wisdom, between curricular commitments and wisdom, between
collegiate orientations and wisdom. The split involves in a complicated
antinomy: the teacher, philosophy, the student, and wisdom.
The history of philosophic instruction within American higher
education has done little to obviate or to heal these lesions. This
instruction has passed over an enormously varied course as the
orientation of its teaching reflects the manifold influences and in-
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volvements predominant in each period. Perhaps three moments can
be isolated which reflect three distinct structures within American
higher education and which embody three divergent approaches to
philosophic initiations: the religious colleges of the 17th and 18th
centuries, the rising Germanified universities of the 19th and early
20th centuries, and the technologized multiversities of our own times.
And corresponding to these patterns of education stand three different
understandings of philosophy: forensic, historical, and technological.
Philosophy as taught in the early religious colleges conceived its
subject-matter as the content of statements, a heritage of wisdom, an
array of conclusions; "theses" they were called in the older Latin
textbooks, in the English manuals and in the Harvard Broadsides.
These buttressed the conclusions of a Renaissance version of Christian
theology or of the rising political doctrines of the body politic. The
function of instruction was the assimilation and defense of their truth.
Philosophy was conceived, all unknowingly within the classically
rhetorical tradition. A truth is laid down for defense, places ("topics"
in rhetoric) are searched for its proof, debate is indicative of its
mastery and persuasion is the finality of its engagement. When this
enterprise was well conducted, it contained rigor in its definition of
terms, clarity in its demonstrations, and exactitude in its argumentation.
The debater was to repeat the counterargument of his opponent in
the precisely ordered relationship of the terms, distinguish the term
or the proposition which was critical, and indicate how this change
bore upon the conclusion. It could be precise and elegant. As it
appeared to its critics, however, it was over-simple in its propositions,
unnuanced in its elaborations, and unconvincing in its "proofs." When
it began to disintegrate, its ignorance of history, its failure to consider the central works of genius of its tradition, and its isolation
from the current discussion among original philosophers left it seriously unfair in its consideration of adversaries, significantly uninteresting
in its presentation of a problematic, and often without the stimulus,
honesty, and challenge of even responsible debate. I can speak with
some experience of this kind of philosophic instruction, because under
the influence of the pontifical universities and Roman seminaries it
lasted in the education of the Jesuit almost a century after it had
passed from American higher education.
The second method of instruction was adopted from Germany to
remedy the obvious decadence of the first. While philosophy had been
rhetoric, now its guide was history. This second conceived wisdom
was that which philosophers taught, and the study of philosophy
became the study of philosophers: "Histories of philosophy" replaced
the systematic textbooks. These histories of philosophy were not the
medieval commentaries upon a single philosophic inquiry, a careful
following of a philosopher in his questioning deeper and deeper into
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his resolution. They were a more or less readable compilation of his
conclusions contextualized by antecedent philosophers, systematized
into an assimilable unity, and evaluated in importance by the impact
these conclusions or methods were to attain with successors. Philosophic
instruction-no matter how much this accusation was denied-became
history; and history, a development incorporating the 19th Century's
enthusiasm for progress, in which each successive continental philosopher found the past the preparation for his own definitive achievement. Philosophy as history was given its unity not by subject matter
and argument but by chronology or by influence or by system. When
the enterprise was well done, it contained care in its textual analysis
and assignations, concern about systematically ambiguous terms and
propositions, and vision in its elaboration of historical patterns. It
could be engrossing and stimulating. As it appeared to its subsequent
critics, however, it was superficial when it attempted to cover vast
periods of philosophy, unphilosophic in its failure to deal carefully
with argument and principle, and deadening both in its location of
questions only within the past and in its pedantic muster of detail.
While the first, in its manual elaborations failed to come to grips with
original philosophers, the second failed to grasp or to occasion rigorous
argument and proof. One presented the student with a series of
conclusions to be defended. The other was a series of facts and
philosophers to be interrelated. Both lent themselves to collegiate
introductory courses in which the major problems or figures within
the philosophy were resolved in a summary fashion. Both lent themselves to too much, too quickly. Both of them initiated the study of
philosophy as the study of propositions already enunciated, either
historically or defensively conceived.
Both left their impact on 20th Century Anglo-American philosophic
inquiry, feeding into it either an enormously varied series of propositions whose discussion was philosophy or an overwhelming heterogeneity of historical opinions whose progression was philosophy. The
dominant philosophy became linguistic and highly technical, attempting
precision in meaning through semantics and accuracy in implication
through logical syntax. Carnap asserted in 1934: " Philosophy is to
be replaced by the logic of science-that is to say by the logical
analysis of the concepts and sentences of science, for the logic of
science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of
science."4 Within the decade, he would move from syntactical to
semantic emphasis, but the matrix of philosophy was consistently
linguistic. So also the unities attempted were no longer those of
4 " Philosophie wird durch Wissenschaftslogick, d.h. logische Analyse der
Begrifje und Siitze der Wissenschaf.t ersetzt ." Rudolf Carnap, Logische Syntax
der Sprache. (Wien: Julius Springer, 1934) p. iii.
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divergent subject matter as aspects of the real, nor those of methodologies and systems worked out of concepts, but those of a language
common to all the sciences. Dubious of metaphysical speculations or
of epistemological criticisms, philosophy could resolve the propositions
of the past into nonsense or unintelligibilities. The history of philosophy
became a tissue of errors. As Professor Vere Chappell defined it: "It
follows tha t the way to achieve success in philosophy-and this again
means understanding a nd the solving of problems- is to determine
how our language is in fact used and thence show where and how
philosophers h ave gone astray. "5 In its finest usages, linguistic philosophy has encouraged a careful honesty in terms and proposition,
precision in methodology, a nd a modesty in assertions. In the eyes of
its critics, however, it has become trivial in its interests and controversies, a rrogantly over-simple in its dismissal of vagueness and
ambiguity, ignorant in its unnuanced reading of the philosophic
tradition, and outdistanced in logic and semantics by the coordinate
disciplines of m a thematics and linguistics. Within this tradition, the
student is introduced to philosophic issues through perspectival discriminations of divergent philosophers and introduced to philosophic
method through logical discipline.
I suggest that either enterprise is not adequate as an introduction
into the philosophic task, most simply because the etymology of the
question fails to tell in its solution how to bring the student to love
wisdom-not to defend it, not to possess it even, but to love it. What
philosophic instruction aims at is this attitude of reverence, dedication,
based upon the deepest affection. L et me stress what I am saying:
It is this love that is the terminus of our work. Our question is how
to awaken such a love. I suggest that neither debate conclusions nor
historical and textual facts nor linguistic techniques are happy solutions to our problem. Love is awakened neither by power nor by assignment. It is awakened by a revelation of the good-by the "standing
before" of wha t has been hidden; and this revelation is of worth, of
value, of what is humanly the object of desire and joy. If philosophy
is to be "taught," it must also be through some sort of vision, a revelation tha t the enterprise of wisdom entails the object of men's deepest
love : that wha tever a m an loves most radically, whatever he moves
toward at the deepest pa rt of his person- the reflexive grasp of these
is the reality of wisdom. Wisdom-either as thought, choice or life
itself- touches upon these ultima tes which a man loves and by which
his life is structured. One is ta ught to love wisdom through the revelation of this relationship. Merleau-Ponty has put this very simply: "To
philosophize is to seek, a nd this is to imply that there are things to
5 V . C . Chappell (ed.), Ordinary Language.
Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 2.
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see and to say."6 One can value this search only through some glimpse
of its objects. The invitation to philosophize is an invitation to
"radical reflection" (again Merleau-Ponty's expression), and one
accepts the invitation only if he discovers a love for the radicalities,
the roots of that within which he moves and loves. The introduction to philosophy, instruction in philosophy, should be a revelation of the depth and the expansion in which a man lives.
Philosophic instruction as revelation would move quite differently
from that of philosophy as rhetoric, as history, or as technique. It
would begin with the man where he is-with what Aristotle calls the
procheira, those things that are before his hand, the proximate and
the immediate. 7 And these are certainly not the possibility of movement or Thales on water or propositional calculus. The task of instruction would be to question these, to probe them, to ask what
is involved in them or why they are of worth. Socrates would begin
with generals and ask about their understanding of courage, an ultimate
which was involved in their lives; or he would ask a good man about
justice, or even a teacher about wisdom and instruction. The data
with which one begins depends very much upon where a particular
man is. The initiation of the philosophic enterprise is the questionthe question which one asks about ultimates involved in his stance. And
the method is to move-in a thousand different possible ways- from
the data which is proximate and which has meaning and worth to
those ultimates in terms of which it is understood and loved.
Now any educational institution confronts enormous problems
with such an understanding of philosophic instruction. Each student
is different. Each lives in a personal set of coordinates, a unique
history, peculiar aspirations, idiosyncratic attitudes and choices. How
can such diversity provide any commonality for philosophic questions?
Does this not make rhetorical defense or historical studies a necessary,
albeit a less ideal, program?
I think not, at least not totally-though there is much to recommend this objection as solid and serious. The personal choices of
the students have already involved them within communities of learning within the college. The students have opted for those studies which
placed them within the major division of undergraduate education.
They are involved in humanistic studies, social sciences, or physical
and biological sciences. One can begin here: with the studies seriously
entertained and the knowledge deeply loved in any of these studies
and move to the philosophical by question and inquiry. Secondly,

6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy. Trans. with a preface
by John Wild and James M. Edie. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1963) p. 41.
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics. i.2. 982b14.
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my fu rther contention would be that as one moves through one of
these divisions in questioning towa rds its ultimates, he will find himself involved in certain constants which run through the considerations
in all of the other divisions. The ultimates which underlie or structure
any particular human enterprise in knowledge or love will be found
to pervade every human enterprise in knowledge and love. Let me
give a n example of what I mean.
If the student were studying physics, one might well begin with
either quantum mechanics or rela tivity theories. Let us say with
quantum mechanics. The class might well read Niels Bohr's great
essay which recounts his discussions with Einstein over thirty years.
The essay is interesting because it immediately introduces the question
of ultimates in physical theory. Both Einstein and Bohr agree upon
the findings of the sub-atomic physics of their period, but they are
in radical disagreement about its implication. As Bohr stated the
question of discussion: " Whether the renunciation of a causal mode
of description of atomic processes involved in the endeavor to cope
with the situation should be regarded as a temporary departure from
id ea ls to be ultima tely revived or whether we are faced with an irrevocable step towa rds obtaining the proper harmony between analysis
and syn thesis of physical phenomena."8 The problem of cause comes
out of physical research itself, but it reaches into social and humanistic
studies. You will recall tha t Thucydides poses the entire a nalysis of
the Peloponnesia n War upon the distinction between the alleged reasons
for the conflict between Athens and Sparta a nd the actua l underlying
cause: the growth of power within the one a nd the inevitable fear that
this occasioned in the other. The grasp of the power-factor within
political movements will a llow those who follow his inquiry to predict
future events when such power blocs amass again .9 In Presen t at the
Creation, one can find a simila r de termin a tion of political and economic
movements seen as an analysis of the America n origin of World \tVa r I
in the growing power of Germany and the fea r and distrust this awa kened in th e United States .10 To understand power is to understand

8 Niels Bohr, " Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in
Atomic Physics," in Albert E instein, Philosop h er-S cientist . Edited by P aul
Ar thur Schilpp. ( New York : H a rper and Row, 1949 ) Vol. i, p. 202. For th e
philosophic implications of this disc uss ion, cf. Richa rd M cK eon, " Philosophy
as a Hum a nism," in Ph iloso phy T oday. ix, No. 3/4 (Fall, 1965 ) pp. 16 3-164.
9 Thucydides, Histo ry of th e Pelopo nnesian War. i. 22-24, 88-90, 118;
ii. 9, 65; iii . 86.
10 " In th e hundred years from W a terloo to Mons, so gradually did th e
power of Germany grow-that combination of popul ation , resources, technology, a nd will- th a t, like the growth of a child. those close to it were hardly
aware of its extent . . . . A century la ter it was thought-erroneously, as it
proved-that th e combined power of Eu rope could stop the German bid . By
1917 it was clea r tha t this could not be done; the United Sta tes intervened
to p revent German domin ation of Europe." Dean Acheson, Present at the
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historical causes. And to grasp causes is, in some way, to predict and
to control the political future. Again, the purpose of the Biographia
Literaria is to locate the principle of greatness in poetic construction,
the works of talent being located in the fancy of the artist while those
of genius, within the great esemplastic imagination, which fuses the
diversities of words, image, movement into a wholeness and unity.I I
Frank Lloyd Wright defines the understanding of that to which he
has given his entire life, organic architecture, in terms of a diversity
of causes. Indeed, his description reads almost like a Schoolman: A
building should be a living organism, proceeding by way of natural
inspiration, from the nature of the materials, the nature of its purpose
in order to gratify the nature of man.12 Within theology, commitments on causality occur and occur critically. Bultmann, for example,
accepts as the principle for the differentiation of myth from hi tory,
a doctrine on causality: The course of nature and history cannot be
interrupted by the intervention of supernatural powers: cause and
effect are phenomenal and form an unbreakable nexus. Anything
which would represent the transcendent as if it were within history,
as if it were a cause of the normal, ordinary order of events is myth.
" D er Mythos objeckiviert das Jenseitige zum Dieseitigen."13
Notice that we have begun with sub-atomic physics, have localized
a term of critical importance to its understanding, and have run this
term through issues of history, political science, literary criticism,
architecture, and biblical exegesis. The issue is what is causality and
how does it function. To start with the procheira, with anything a t
hand, and to question it in depth is to move finally to the philosophic
commitments and presuppositions which underpin and justify the
obvious. While the issue can come out of any human enterprise,
it is bound to none. Conversely, while proper to none of these individually, it unites them all in common assumptions and language.
What would be further noted is that the doctrine implicit in one
field will have a telling, even if unexamined, influence in another.
Atomic doctrines of causality can jump over into pointellisma painting. Evolutionary conceptions of biology causa lity can move into
dogmatic development, historical progress, and educational or moral
Creation. (New York: Norton, 1969) p. 4. "The decision to intervene did
P.Ot flow from a general principle of foreign policy, but as a specific distru st
and fear of German intentions and ruthlessness. German miscalculation an d
stupidity fanned the fear." I bid., ftnt . to page 4, p. 740.
11 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Litteraria. Chs . 10-13. As contained in Selected Poe.try and Prose of Coleridge (New York: Modern Library,
1951) pp. 191-263.
12 Frank Lloyd Wright, "The Architect," in The Works of the Mind.
Edited hy Robert B. Heywood. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1966) p. 51.
13 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Myth ology. ( New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958) pp. 14-19.
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instruction. The great ultimates, those terms and assumptions which
underlie any field of knowledge, are the province of philosophic inquiry.
Any science or art subsumes them, implies them, contains them.
Philosophic question isolates them, examines them, and relates them
within the most basic human relationship: that of man to reality.
The alternative to such an examination, to philosophic inquiry, is
not that men will have no philosophy, but that it will be cultu rally
conditioned and immaturely accepted. Philip Frank, the great H arvard
physicist, has put the matter very well, a la Whitehead:
Quite a few great thinkers who belonged to very divergent schools of thought have been unanimous on one
point: If a scientist believes that he has no philosophy
and keeps tightly to his special field, he will really become an adherent to some "chance philosophy" as A. N.
Whitehead puts it. This great contemporary metaphysician with a solid scientific background assures us that
for a scientist deliberately to neglect philosophy is "to
assume the correctness of the chance philosophic prejudices imbibed from a nurse or a schoolmaster or
current modes of expression ."14
Philosophic instruction belongs to the undergraduate, to the liberal
studies of the college, then, ( 1) not only because it unifies them
organically in a consideration of their common assumptions (however
divergent their use and applications ) , (2) but also because it frees the
student from the prejudices of his own context by a reflexive grasp
of their structure and an expanded understanding of alternative
possibilities. Thus it is that every philosophic tradition moves back
to a grasp of principles, whether through a metaphysics of first
causes or a critique of the initial possibilities of knowledge or a
foundation study of science and mathematics to determine radical
meanings and referents.
Programmatically, philosophic inquiry should not begin with conclusions of a particular cultu re to be defended nor with the conclusions
of many philosophers to be assimilated nor perspectives to be choc:en
or refuted. It should take its data from the students, from fields other
than those classically called philosophic. It should lay against these
data questions which will take the student into their underlying presuppositions or into those ideals which give the here and now its justification and its worth. The processes by which one moves through
the initial data to the ultimates it contains (and which contain it )
are many, and their steps are many: One can begin with the apprecia14 Philip Frank, Modern Science and I ts Philosophy. (Cambridge: H arvard
University Press, 1950) p. 265.
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tion of a film, to a consideration of critical principles which structured
this a ppreciation, to a consideration of principles of art and beauty
which in turn structured both the criticism and the appreciation. In
other words, one can move from " why do I like it or why did I not
like it," to "why is it good or bad" to "what kind of thing is it and
what kind of integrity should it have." This is to move by question
from appreciation through criticism to aesthetics and metaphysics.
And notice, one is not introducing new da ta. He is working, questioning what is already present and assumed . The philosophic goes
beyond appreciation and criticism precisely by entering into it, by
inquiry into meanings and methods which either of these take for
granted. Indeed philosophic inquiry begins when one questions what
is taken for granted-not to deny it (this would be as dogma tic as
its gratuitous assumption) but to call it before radical reflection.
Granted that this is valid philosophic procedure, is it a possible
educational arrangement? Again, I think so, but only within a
liberal arts college in which ( 1) the faculty took their mutual collaboration seriously enough to be willing to discuss with and to learn
from one a nother, a nd (2) the administration encouraged the cohesion
of th e college as an academic unity, a unity whose formal structure
was intellectual and among whose liberating skills were the abilities
to move from field to field with an understa nding and a recognition
of basic assumptions, if not a technical grasp of elaborations a nd
applications. In such a college, the initial "courses in philosophy"
would not be either doctrinal nor historica l nor perspectival; they
would not be set alongside the other courses in English literature
or second year calculus. They would be transition courses, courses in
which the major works in a particular field were read for their common
assumptions- be those assumptions of principles, methods, concepts
or reality-stances.
Each major division of the college could offer such courses: The
physical scientist could begin with the works of Galileo, Newton,
Maxwell, Einstein and H eisenberg. Basic terms would operate
through the discussion of each of these works, but their meaning and
their applications would vary : motion , space/place, necessity, probability and chance, time, force, cause, etc. Methods would vary as
one shifted from the mathematic models of Gali leo, brought to bear
upon physical phenomena to yield fruitful results, to the strictly
logistic composition of forces in Newtonian mechanics as one eventually constructed the Systema Mundi from the initial coroll aries of
the parallelogram of forces. This serious, careful reading would give
the students neither a single doctrine on "causality" and motion , nor
an entire history of the question nor perspectives to be refuted. It
would open up the term itself for inquiry and the projects of great
men would suggest some of the radical variations possible in its
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pluralistic resolution. The social sciences could offer similar courses
in the concepts and methods common to critical work in their own
field: institution, freedom, man, power, and law-for a selective
example. Art and literature could open their inquiry with works
of appreciation and criticism which presuppose such concepts as
imitation, creativity, beauty, art-obj ect, etc. And notice that the
divisional separations ultimately yield before this kind of examination
as the terms and presuppositions are seen to be common to the
humanities, the social, biological, and physical sciences. Time, for
example, and its relationship to place is as critical a question in the
structure of the Magic Mountain and in the theology of Augustine
as it is in the physics of Einstein. The infinite figures in the universe
of Newton, in the mathematics of Galileo, but also in the Opus
Oxioniense of Duns Scotus and in the critical theories of Ruskin.
Notice further that this is not an investigation of physics or hi.story
or criticism for answers to the philosophic question. Physicists are
not asked to decide about ethics, and dramatists are not queried about
God. One is interested in what is necessary to do physics or drama,
what it is necessary to assume by way of meanings and methods. This
is rather to probe them to show that the philosophic question emerges
from the heart of their own assumptions, that it both defines the nature
of the peculiar enterprise of each and provides a principle of selection
and relevance even for data.
Such transition courses would be liberal in the medieval sense of
grammar: an ability to interpret, to read or listen so carefully that
the ultimate assumptions are forthcoming. It would be philosophic
grammar in that its thrust is towards these ultimate, pervasive conceptions. Once they are isolated, once one is found irrvocably involved in a commitment to prerequisites, one can move from philosophic grammar to the history of philosophy or even to philosophic
inquiry itself, to courses whose explicit focus is the nature of motion,
the structure of art, the reality of institutions, the possibilities of
freedom. This "grammar" will make inquiry not only enriched beyond
possibility of a: single dogmatism, but relevant to the life and the
career of the student. It will show him that just as life or need has
led him to art or biology, so art and biology inevitably involve him
in philosophic commitments and questions. Most students are not
capable of sustained and serious work within philosophic inquiry as
such- at least on the undergraduate level. But they are capable of
philosophy-of seeing the need for wisdom in their lives and longing
for it, of loving it. Once this commitment to wisdom energizes and
unites the student, technical training in philosophy is not only subsequential, but imperative. History, semantics, logic, argumentation
and even defense can contribute as one moves from the love of wisdom
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to its possession. But without this initial love, the technical training
is without purpose or focus.
When I spoke of data offered by a liberal arts college as the
subject of a philosophic question, I detailed a number of fields in
which concepts and methods could be isolated: literature, physics,
history, etc. I did so, because, since the Renaissance, our conception
of liberal arts is that of various fields, various subject-matters, the
command over which supplies a new freedom to the students. But
there is an older conception of liberal education, one dating from the
Middle Ages and which conceives the liberal arts as disciplines, as
skills which can be brought to bear upon any subject-matter or any
field. Rhetoric, poetic grammar, and dialectic (sometimes) could be
brought to bear upon any discourse--either in literature or in scienceto discover the structure of its argument, to criticize the work as a
single unity, to understand the meaning of its terms and assertives
or to resolve the work to its presuppositions and interconvictions with
other such works. The fault of contemporary liberal arts is that the
emphasis upon subject-matter has so particularized each field as to
make communication difficult between them; the fault with those
of the Middle Ages was that the techniques for formal analysis became abstracted from subject-matter and fact.15 R. S. Crane and
Richard McKeon could contend, however, that there are those
universal disciplines, operative, even if unarticulated, within contemporary liberal arts, pervasively present in almost all undergradua te courses but studied as such by very few: Criticism, History ( from
history of philosophy and theology to natural histo1y and experimental
histories), Linguistics perhaps should rank among them.16 Philosophic
education within the liberal arts should function here as it functions
with the more obviously recognized fields: isolate their assumptions
and question them. Such a course at Chicago, for example, seriously
questions the meaning of rhetoric as it moves from a pseudo-art in
the Gorgias, to one of the universal arts in Aristotle, to the universal
method of all philosophy in the De Inuentione, to furnish the scientific
method for the Nouum Organum in Bacon. Philosophic grammar,
brought to bear upon rhetoric, would again reveal a pluralism of
15 Among the many studies of Rich ard P . McKean on this subject, cf. "The
Nature and Teaching of the Humanities," Journal of General Education 3
( 1949), pp. 290-303. "Action and the Use of the Humanities," Comprendre
No. 15 (Venice, 1956) pp. 69-83. "The Liberating Arts and the Humanizing
Arts in Education," in Humanistic Education and Western Civilization: Essays
for Robert M. Hutchins. Edited by Arthur A. Cohen. (New York: Holt,
Rinehart a nd Winston, 1964) pp. 158-1 81.
16 R. S. Crane, The Idea of the Human ities. (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1967) Vol. i, pp. 7-11. For the historica l elaboration of these
discussions at the University of Chicago, cf. Richard McKean, "Richard
McKean," American Spiritual Autobiographies. Edited by Louis Finkelstein.
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948) pp. 90-92.
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possibilities and the subsequent matter for an innovation and an organization of sciences and arts for our time-a task of proper philosophic
mquuy.
The initial pages of this paper pointed out the three-fold ambiguity
within which philosophic instruction moved: the dichotomy between
teacher and wisdom, between philosophy and wisdom, and between
education and wisdom. The introduction of philosophic grammar as
the initiation of philosophic inquiry would go a long way to chart a
path through them:
1. For pace Wittgenstein, the teacher, does not pretend to a
competence in wisdom, but to a love and probing movement which
moves him continually to ask questions and to isolate the assumptions
which underlie a ll human knowledge.

2. Philosophy does not surrender its subject-matter, its methods
a nd its conclusions to the other knowledges of men, but indicates
that each of these knowledges presupposes those things which form
the subject-ma tter of philosophy.
3. And the educational proj ection of inability or distinterest among
the students falls against a program tha t moves through the student's
own interests and life-long commitments to those concepts, as yet
unexamined, by which these interests are evoked a nd by which these
commitments are justified.

000====
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